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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in 
and for the County of Ada, the Honorable Melissa Moody, presided. Defendant/ Appellant Scott 
Alan Moore, has brought this appeal based upon the following issues: Whether the court's 
denial of relief under Idaho Code§ 19-2604(c)(3) was a violation of his equal protection rights 
under the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution and whether the legislature's 
requirement that prosecutor's stipulate to the relief of I. C. § 19-2604( c )(3) is an unconstitutional 
violation of the Separation of Powers. 
Course of Proceedings 
This matter originally came before the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, by 
way of a complaint filed the 22nd day of November, 2002, charging that on the 28th day of 
August, 2002, Defendant/Appellant Scott Alan Moore ("Defendant/Appellant"), did commit the 
crime(s) of Aiding and Abetting a Robbery, Felony, I.C. § 18-6501, 6502, 18-204, waived into 
adult court pursuant to I.C. § 20-509, by leading a victim to a remote place in order that his co-
defendants could rob victim of his property. (R., pp. 8-10). On the 30th of December an 
Information was filed against Defendant/ Appellant charging the same. (R., 28-29). 
On the 28th of February 2003 Defendant/Appellant's guilty plea was filed by the comi. (R. 43-
46). 
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On the 6th of June, 2003 District Judge Darla S. Williamson adjudged Defendant/Appellant 
convicted upon a plea of guilty of the offense of Aiding and Abetting a Robbery, a felony 
contrary to LC.§ 18-6501, 6502, 18-204 and sentenced to a minimum fixed and determinate 
period of two (2) years confinement thereafter followed by an indeterminate period of custody of 
up to three (3) years with the Idaho State Board of Corrections. Defendant/ Appellant was further 
ordered to pay a fine of two thousand dollars ($2000) plus court costs and into the Victim's 
Compensation Fund. The Court retained jurisdiction for 180 days under LC.§ 19-2601(4). (R., 
pp. 54-56). 
On the 8th of December 2003 the Court ordered suspension of its sentence and ordered 
Defendant/Appellant Scott Alan Moore to five (5) years probation subject to specified terms and 
conditions. (R., 65-70). 
On the 14th of May, 2014 Defendant/Appellant filed his Motion to Amend Judgment of 
Conviction, Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
2604, (R., 77-79), and the Affidavit of Scott Alan Moore In Support of Motion to Amend 
Judgment of Conviction, Order Suspending Sentence, and Order of Probation Pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 19-2604. (Affidavit In Support of Motion). In the Affidavit, Defendant/Appellant 
expressed remorse for his mistakes made as a juvenile (Defendant/ Appellant's charges were 
brought months before his eighteenth birthday), attested as to his complete compliance with the 
terms of his probation, and the dramatic change of course in his life since his conviction 
including his is marriage and his sustained employment involving his supervisory position 
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enforcing compliance with rules and regulations pertaining to food safety procedures. (Affidavit 
pp. 1-4). 
On the 9th day of July, 2014 the State filed its Objection To Defendant's Motion to Amend 
Judgment of Conviction, Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation Pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 19-2604. (State's Objection). The objection included no factual support nor rational 
indication as to why the prosecuting attorney refused to stipulate to the relief. (State's 
Objection). 
On the 11th of July 2014 a hearing on the Defendant/ Appellant's Motion was heard in Judge 
Moody's court. On July 14th, 2014 District Judge Melissa Moody's Order Denying Motion to 
Amend Judgment of Conviction was filed. 
On the 1st of August 2014 Defendant/ Appellant timely submitted its Notice of Appeal filed on 
August 5th, 2014. (R., 83-86). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Does the Jurisdictional Requirement That Prosecutor Stipulate to Relief Sought 
Under Idaho Code § 19-2604 Violate Separation of Powers? 
II. Does Idaho Code§ 19-2604 Violate the Appellant's Equal Protection Rights Under 
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 2 of the 
Idaho Constitution? 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho Code § 19-2604 provides relief to defendants convicted of varying crimes in the 
state of Idaho by affording them an opportunity to apply to amend judgments made against them. 
On April 3, 2013 The Idaho Legislature amended I.C. § 19-2604 to provide that "a defendant 
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who has been convicted of a felony and who has been discharged from probation may apply to 
the sentencing court for a reduction of the conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor." LC.§ 
19-2604(3). Jurisdiction to apply for relief pursuant to subsection (3) of the statute requires that 
the prosecuting attorney stipulate to an application where certain crimes are at issue. LC. § 19-
2604(3). At issue in the instant case Idaho Code§ 19-2604(3)(c) reads: 
If at least five (5) years have elapsed since the defendant's discharge from 
probation, and if the defendant was convicted of any of the following offenses, 
the application may be granted only if the prosecuting attorney stipulates to the 
reduction: ... 
(ix) Robbery (18-6501, Idaho Code); ... 
Ch. 256, § 1, 2013 Idaho Sess. Laws (S.B. 1151) (effective July 1, 2013). This provision of the 
statute effectively grants the prosecuting attorney unbridled discretion to bar jurisdiction for 
defendants convicted of certain criminal violations. 
A. Idaho Code§ 19-2604(3) Unconstitutionally Delegates Lawmaking and 
Judicial Powers to Prosecutors In Violation of the Separation of Powers 
Aliicle II, § 1, of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
depaiiments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of 
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
depmiments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, 
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
'"The separation of powers doctrine embodies the concept that the three branches of government, 
legislative, executive ai1d judicial, should remain separate and distinct so that each is able to 
operate independently."' State v. Moore, 150 Idaho 17,244 P.3d 161 (2010) quoting Sweeney v. 
Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 139, 804 P.2d 308,312 (1990). "The general rules of statutory 
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construction apply to constitutional provisions generally." Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 
403, 757 P.2d 664,666 (1988); Engelking v. Investment Board, 93 Idaho 217,221,458 P.2d 213, 
217 (1969) ("[T]he general rules of statutory construction apply to the amendment of a 
constitution as well as to constitutional provisions generally"); Lewis v. Woodall, 72 Idaho 16, 
18, 236 P .2d 91, 93 (1951) ("[T]he statutory rules of construction apply to the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions"); Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 437, 195 P .2d 662, 670 
(1948) ("[G]eneral principles of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of 
constitutions"); Higer v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 45, 52, 170 P.2d 411,415 (1946) ("The same rules 
apply to the construction of provisions of the Constitution as apply to construction of 
statutes"); Phipps v. Boise St. Car Co., 61 Idaho 740, 747, 107 P.2d 148, 151 (1940) ("The 
general provisions of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of constitutions"). 
Here, Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) improperly and unconstitutionally delegates lawmaking 
and/or judicial authority to the prosecutor by limiting relief to those defendants with whom the 
prosecuting attorney stipulates to relief. LC. § 19-2604(3). Because the statute fails to set 
criteria that the prosecuting attorney is to use in deciding whether to stipulate to a defendant's 
application under subsection (3), and because the statute fails to otherwise restrain such 
prosecutorial discretion to the purpose of accompanying subsections and subparagraphs, the 
prosecuting attorney is left to in effect legislate its own purpose and intent for granting or 
denying a defendant's jurisdictional access to relief. LC. § 19-2604(3). Even in the event that a 
construction, or self-imposed prosecutorial exercise, of the statute restrains the prosecuting 
attorney's decision to stipulate or not stipulate to the purposes otherwise set out by the law, the 
statute's jurisdictional requirement for the prosecuting attorney's stipulation still violates Article 
II, § 1 and Article V, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution by "depriv[ing] the judicial depmiment of any 
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power or jurisdiction which rightly pe1iains to it as a coordinate depaiiment of the government," 
art. V, § 1, and placing such power to adjudicate the merit of a defendant's application for relief 
pursuant to the statute with the prosecuting attorney alone and in such a cryptic way that lends 
itself to a lack of any oversight or accountability which is wholly inconsistent the Constitutional 
principles of due process and equal protection. 
B. Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) Unconstitutionally Denies Equal Protection of the Law 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in part that: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
A1iicle I, Section 2 of the Idaho State Constitution provides that "[a]ll political power is inherent 
in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit. .. " ID CONST A1i. 
I, § 2. "The principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause of both [State and Federal] 
Constitutions is that all persons in like circumstances should receive the same benefits and 
burdens of the law." Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. State, 117 Idaho 1002, 793 P2.d 675 
(1989). 
"The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to 
secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its 
improper execution through duly constituted agents." 
Village a/Willowbrook, 528 U.S. 562,564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 1074-1075 (2000) citing Sioux City 
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,445 (1923) quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. 
Township a/Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350,352 (1918). The Court analyzes alleged violations of 
Equal Protection concurrently. See Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351,357, 787 P.2d 
1159, 1165 (1990) (analyzing the federal and state guarantees concurrently); Leliefeld v. 
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Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 372-75, 659 P.2d 111, 126-29 (1983) (same); Standlee v. State, 96 
Idaho 849,853,538 P.2d 778, 782 (1975) (same). 
In any equal protection analysis, the Court must: (1) identify the classification at issue, 
(2) determine the standard ofreview to apply, and (3) apply the standard. See State v. Avelar, 
129 Idaho 700,703,931 P.2d 1218, 1221 (1997). 
1. Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) Discriminates By Classifying Def end ants 
Based Upon Favor With Prosecutor 
The first part of the equal protection analysis involves identification of the classification 
at issue. The classification at issue in the instant case involves those defendants seeking relief 
pursuant to LC. §19-2604(3) with whom the prosecutor has stipulated to the relief, versus 
identically situated persons seeking to amend judgment pursuant to LC. § 19-2604(3) from with 
whom the prosecutor has not stipulated to the relief. 
2. Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) Fails Both Means-Focus and Rational Basis 
Scrutiny 
The next part of the equal protection analysis involves determining the standard of review 
to apply. "When considering the Fourteenth Amendment, strict scrutiny applies to fundamental 
rights and suspect classes; inte1mediate scrutiny applies to classifications involving gender and 
illegitimacy; and rational basis scrutiny applies to all other challenges." State v. Doe, 155 Idaho 
99,104,305 P.3d 543,548 (Ct. App. 2013) citing Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258, 
261-62, 954 P .2d 676, 679-80 (1998). Under the Idaho Constitution, slightly different levels of 
scrutiny apply. Strict scrutiny, as under federal law, applies to fundamental rights and suspect 
classes. Id. Means-focus scrutiny, unlike the federal intermediate scrutiny, is employed "where 
the discriminatory character of a challenged statutory classification is apparent on its face and 
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where there is also a patent indication of a lack of relationship between the classification and the 
declared purpose of the statute." Id and State v. Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751, 755, 9 P.3d 1217, 1221 
(2000) both quoting Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,395, 987 P.2d 300,307 
(1999) (quoting Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97 Idaho 859,871,555 P.2d 399,411 (1976)). 
"[T]he classification must be 'obviously invidiously discriminatory' before the means-focus test 
will be used." Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 Idaho 560,569, 38 P.3d 598,607 (2001) quoting State 
v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 830, 25 P.3d 850, 853 (2001). Rational basis scrutiny applies to all other 
challenges. See Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 395, 987 P.2d at 307. 
a. Court Should Apply Means-Focus Scrutiny In Deciding State 
Equal Protection Claim 
Here, the discriminatory classification between those who have the stipulated support of 
the prosecuting attorney and those who do not is apparent on the face of LC. § 19-2604(3). The 
subsection of the statute reads "the application may be granted only if the prosecuting attorney 
stipulates to the reduction: ... ," LC.§ 19-2604(3)(c), and that "[t]he decision as to whether to 
grant such an application shall be in the discretion of the district comi, provided that the 
application may be granted only if the cowi finds that: ... (iv) In those cases where the 
stipulation of the prosecuting attorney is required under paragraph (b) or ( c) of this subsection, 
the prosecuting attorney has so stipulated." LC.§ 19-2604(3)(d)(iv). The classification is 
obviously invidiously discriminatory because it places a defendant's opportunity for relief 
wholly in the hands of the prosecuting attorney, a party that by the very design of our adversarial 
system of justice has up to the point of application-and arguably even during the course of 
application continues to be-in a position calculated to demand adversarial scrutiny naturally 
exciting animosity and ill will. 
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As to the second element required to apply means-focus scrutiny, here there is a patent 
lack of a relationship between the requirement for the prosecuting attorney's stipulation and the 
declared purpose of the statute, which is to afford opportunity for relief from the charge of a 
felony to a misdemeanor for those defendants convicted of a felony that are able to demonstrate 
they are no longer a risk to their community and that there exists good cause for relief. Where 
LC. § 19-2604(3) and its subparagraphs ( d)(i)-(ii) establish rational criteria related to the purpose 
of LC. § 19-2604, the jurisdictional bar to relief in the absence of a prosecutor's stipulation does 
not relate to nor serve the purpose of the statute, particularly where the statute charges the court 
with issuing findings pursuant to the qualifying criteria prior to granting relief, LC. § 19-
2604(3)( d), and such findings are informed by the opportunity to object to the relief at hearing. 
The statute likewise fails inform the prosecutor as to how to determine whether or not to stipulate 
to an application, the prosecutor's discretion is arbitrarily granted. 
b. Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) Fails Rational Basis Scrutiny 
In State v. Mowrey the Supreme Court of Idaho denied a defendant's state and federal 
equal protection challenge to LC. § 19-2604 on rational basis scrutiny. 134 Idaho 751, 9 P.3d 
1217. In Mowrey, the defendant originally pleaded guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen (16) (LC.§ 18-1508), subsequently applied for relief pursuant to LC.§ 19-2604 to amend 
judgment from a felony to a misdemeanor, but was denied said relief. Id. The Supreme Comi 
rejected Mowrey's argument that the subsection discriminated between equally situated persons 
convicted of sexual offenses against minors given at that time the legislative intent of LC. § 19-
2604(3), which has subsequently been amended to subsection LC. § 19-2604( 4), included the 
detailed statement of purpose explaining that the subsection "was meant to amend LC.§ 19-
2604 'so that there would be no allowable amendment of judgment afforded to offenders 
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of certain crimes against children'-namely, LC.§§ 18-1506, 18-1507, and 18-1508. Statement 
of Purpose, RS 22612 (1989) (emphasis added)." Mowrey, 134 Idaho at 755, 9 P.3d at 1221. In 
its decision the Court cited the state's legitimate interest in protecting children from sexual abuse 
and held that the statute's, then LC. § 19-2604(3), absolute preclusion ofrelief for defendants 
convicted under LC.§§ 18-1506, 18-1507, and 18-1508, effectively increased penalties for 
perpetrators of sexual abuse against children and was a rational method of protecting children. 
Id 
Mowrey is distinguishable from the instant case for a number of reasons. First, the 
challenged subsection of statute, LC. § 19-2604(3), does not absolutely preclude those convicted 
of any of the offenses articulated by LC.§ 19-2604(3)(c)(i)-(xv) from relief, as was the case in 
Mowrey with certain sexual offenders. Instead, here the jurisdictional bar to relief for those 
convicted of any of the offenses listed by LC.§ 19-2604(3)(c)(i)-(xv) lies in the statute's 
discrimination between those of a class who have their application stipulated to by the prosecutor 
and those who do not. There is no rational basis articulated by the statute, nor is there any 
rational basis articulated by the State's refusal to stipulate in the instant case, (State's Objection), 
for the discriminatory treatment between those previously convicted of an underlying offense 
who have paid their dues and turned a comer in their lives while holding a prosecutor's 
stipulation to relief, and those previously convicted of an underlying offense who have paid their 
dues and turned a comer in their lives that do not hold a prosecutor's stipulation. The distinction 
is arbitrary. Likewise, there is no set of facts that could form a rational basis supporting the 
statute's purpose for the requirement that applicants must obtain the stipulation of the prosecutor 
given the statute provides for the court's discretion in granting or denying the relief, including 
opportunity for the State's objection while effectuating its proper adversarial role within the 
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context of court proceeding. LC.§ 19-2604(3)(d). The statute's provision that the prosecutor 
concurrently serve as adversary to and arbiter of a defendant's access to a judge's impartial 
adjudication on the merits serves no legitimate nor rational purpose and constitutes an open 
invitation for the cryptic abuse of discretion as has occurred in the instant case. Such a statutory 
scheme is proscribed by both federal and state constitutional guarantees of equal protection 
under the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that Idaho Code§ 19-2604(3) violates Aiiicle II, § 
1 and Article V, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution in violating the Separation of Powers by 
unconstitutionally delegating the prosecutor lawmaking and judicial authority. Furthermore, 
Idaho Code§ 19-2604(3) violates Article I,§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution in that Appellant has been denied equal protection 
under the law as a result of the law placing persons in a class wholly unrelated to the objective of 
the statute. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this this court find that Idaho Code § 19-260 is 
unconstitutional and that this matter be remanded back to District Court for Further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of October, 2014. 
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